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Yuan Deng
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Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence
V Conitzer, W Sinnott-Armstrong, JS Borg, Y Deng, M Kramer
Thirty-first AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
2232017
Towards efficient auctions in an auto-bidding world
Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021, 3965-3973, 2021
722021
Strategizing against no-regret learners
Y Deng, J Schneider, B Sivan
Advances in neural information processing systems 32, 2019
712019
Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world
S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34, 17777-17788, 2021
632021
The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization
S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Available at SSRN 3785579, 2021
602021
Homotopy analysis for tensor PCA
A Anandkumar, Y Deng, R Ge, H Mobahi
Conference on Learning Theory, 79-104, 2017
552017
Prior-free dynamic auctions with low regret buyers
Y Deng, J Schneider, B Sivan
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32, 2019
342019
Approximately efficient bilateral trade
Y Deng, J Mao, B Sivan, K Wang
Proceedings of the 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2022
322022
Multi-channel autobidding with budget and roi constraints
Y Deng, N Golrezaei, P Jaillet, JCN Liang, V Mirrokni
International Conference on Machine Learning, 7617-7644, 2023
312023
Efficiency of the first-price auction in the autobidding world
Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, H Zhang, S Zuo
arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.10650, 2022
302022
Optimal mechanisms for value maximizers with budget constraints via target clipping
S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Columbia Business School Research Paper, 2022
192022
Fairness in the autobidding world with machine-learned advice
Y Deng, N Golrezaei, P Jaillet, JCN Liang, V Mirrokni
arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.04748 4, 2022
182022
A data-driven metric of incentive compatibility
Y Deng, S Lahaie, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020, 1796-1806, 2020
162020
A robust non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism for contextual auctions
Y Deng, S Lahaie, V Mirrokni
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32, 2019
16*2019
Autobidding auctions in the presence of user costs
Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, H Zhang, S Zuo
Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2023, 3428-3435, 2023
122023
Robust pricing in dynamic mechanism design
Y Deng, S Lahaie, V Mirrokni
International Conference on Machine Learning, 2494-2503, 2020
112020
Coalition manipulation of Gale-Shapley algorithm
W Shen, P Tang, Y Deng
Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018
11*2018
Posted pricing and dynamic prior-independent mechanisms with value maximizers
Y Deng, V Mirrokni, H Zhang
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35, 24158-24169, 2022
102022
Prior-independent dynamic auctions for a value-maximizing buyer
Y Deng, H Zhang
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34, 13847-13858, 2021
102021
Non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism design with budget constraints and beyond
Y Deng, V Mirrokni, S Zuo
Available at SSRN 3383231, 2019
102019
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