| Approval-based apportionment M Brill, P Gölz, D Peters, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, K Wilker Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34 (02), 1854-1861, 2020 | 50* | 2020 |
| Picking sequences and monotonicity in weighted fair division M Chakraborty, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, W Suksompong Artificial Intelligence 301, 103578, 2021 | 33 | 2021 |
| Popular branchings and their dual certificates T Kavitha, T Király, J Matuschke, I Schlotter, U Schmidt-Kraepelin Mathematical Programming 192 (1), 567-595, 2022 | 25 | 2022 |
| Liquid democracy with ranked delegations M Brill, T Delemazure, AM George, M Lackner, U Schmidt-Kraepelin Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 36 (5), 4884-4891, 2022 | 24 | 2022 |
| Weighted envy-freeness for submodular valuations L Montanari, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, W Suksompong, N Teh Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38 (9), 9865-9873, 2024 | 21 | 2024 |
| Margin of victory for tournament solutions M Brill, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, W Suksompong Artificial Intelligence 302, 103600, 2022 | 15 | 2022 |
| The price of justified representation E Elkind, P Faliszewski, A Igarashi, P Manurangsi, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, ... ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 12 (3), 1-27, 2024 | 13 | 2024 |
| The popular assignment problem: when cardinality is more important than popularity∗ T Kavitha, T Király, J Matuschke, I Schlotter, U Schmidt-Kraepelin Proceedings of the 2022 annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms …, 2022 | 11 | 2022 |
| Refining tournament solutions via margin of victory M Brill, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, W Suksompong Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34 (02), 1862-1869, 2020 | 11 | 2020 |
| Margin of victory in tournaments: Structural and experimental results M Brill, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, W Suksompong Proceedings of the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI …, 2021 | 9 | 2021 |
| Proportional representation in matching markets: selecting multiple matchings under dichotomous preferences N Boehmer, M Brill, U Schmidt-Kraepelin Social Choice and Welfare, 1-42, 2023 | 8* | 2023 |
| Maintaining Perfect Matchings at Low Cost J Matuschke, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, J Verschae 46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP …, 2019 | 8 | 2019 |
| Democratising forest management: Applying multiwinner approval voting to tree selection A Pommerening, M Brill, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, J Haufe Forest Ecology and Management 478, 118509, 2020 | 6 | 2020 |
| Project-fair and truthful mechanisms for budget aggregation R Freeman, U Schmidt-Kraepelin Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38 (9), 9704-9712, 2024 | 5 | 2024 |
| Multiwinner voting with possibly unavailable candidates M Brill, H Dindar, J Israel, J Lang, J Peters, U Schmidt-Kraepelin Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 37 (5), 5532-5539, 2023 | 5 | 2023 |
| Monotone randomized apportionment J Correa, P Gölz, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, J Tucker-Foltz, V Verdugo Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 71-71, 2024 | 4 | 2024 |
| Approval-based committee voting in practice: a case study of (over-) representation in the Polkadot blockchain N Boehmer, M Brill, A Cevallos, J Gehrlein, L Sánchez-Fernández, ... Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38 (9), 9519-9527, 2024 | 4 | 2024 |
| Justifying groups in multiwinner approval voting E Elkind, P Faliszewski, A Igarashi, P Manurangsi, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, ... Theoretical Computer Science 969, 114039, 2023 | 3 | 2023 |
| Justifying groups in multiwinner approval voting E Elkind, P Faliszewski, A Igarashi, P Manurangsi, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, ... International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 472-489, 2022 | 3 | 2022 |
| Truthful Budget Aggregation: Beyond Moving-Phantom Mechanisms M de Berg, R Freeman, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, M Utke arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.20303, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
Markus BrillUniversity of WarwickE-mailová adresa ověřena na: warwick.ac.uk