Vasilis Gkatzelis

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Richard ColeProfessor of Computer Science, Courant Institute, New York UniversityVerificeret mail på cs.nyu.edu
Xizhi TanPhD. Student, Drexel UniversityVerificeret mail på drexel.edu
Daniel SchoepflinPostdoc; DIMACS - Rutgers UniversityVerificeret mail på drexel.edu
Eric BalkanskiColumbia UniversityVerificeret mail på columbia.edu
Tim RoughgardenColumbia UniversityVerificeret mail på cs.columbia.edu
Alkmini SgouritsaAthens University of Economics and BusinessVerificeret mail på aueb.gr
Kostas KolliasGoogle ResearchVerificeret mail på google.com
Nisarg ShahAssociate Professor, University of TorontoVerificeret mail på cs.toronto.edu
Siddhartha BanerjeeAssociate Professor, Operations Research, Cornell UniversityVerificeret mail på cornell.edu
Billy JinCornell UniversityVerificeret mail på cornell.edu
Gagan GoelResearch Scientist, GoogleVerificeret mail på google.com
Alexandros PsomasAssistant Professor, Purdue UniversityVerificeret mail på cs.purdue.edu
Vahab MirrokniGoogle Fellow, VP, Google ResearchVerificeret mail på google.com
Jose CorreaUniversidad de ChileVerificeret mail på uchile.cl
Neil OlverLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceVerificeret mail på lse.ac.uk
Pranav Garimidia16z Crypto ResearchVerificeret mail på columbia.edu
Sadra YazdanbodGoogleVerificeret mail på google.com
nikhil r. devanurAmazonVerificeret mail på nikhildevanur.com
Vijay VaziraniDistinguished Professor, Dept. of Computer Science, University of California, Irvine.Verificeret mail på ics.uci.edu
Tung MaiAdobe ResearchVerificeret mail på adobe.com

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Vasilis Gkatzelis

Drexel University, Computer Science

Verificeret mail på drexel.edu - Startside

Algorithmic Game Theory Mechanism Design Fair Division Approximation Algorithms


Titel Sortér efter henvisninger Sortér efter årstal Sortér efter titel	Citeret af Citeret af	År
Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items R Cole, V Gkatzelis SIAM Journal on Computing 47 (3), 1211-1236, 2018	208	2018
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare R Cole, NR Devanur, V Gkatzelis, K Jain, T Mai, VV Vazirani, ... Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation, 2017	190	2017
Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments R Cole, V Gkatzelis, G Goel Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 251-268, 2013	115	2013
Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games R Cole, JR Correa, V Gkatzelis, V Mirrokni, N Olver Games and Economic Behavior 92, 306-326, 2015	106*	2015
Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games V Gkatzelis, K Kollias, T Roughgarden Operations Research, 2016	85*	2016
Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints K Yang, V Gkatzelis, J Stoyanovich Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on …, 2019	83	2019
Pricing private data V Gkatzelis, C Aperjis, BA Huberman Electronic Markets, 1-15, 2015	83	2015
Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture V Gkatzelis, D Halpern, N Shah 2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2020	77	2020
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents S Brânzei, V Gkatzelis, R Mehta Operations Research, 2021	75*	2021
Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions S Banerjee, V Gkatzelis, A Gorokh, B Jin Proceedings of the 33rd ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 22), 2022	61	2022
The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions P Dütting, V Gkatzelis, T Roughgarden Mathematics of Operations Research 42 (4), 897-914, 2017	57	2017
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location P Agrawal, E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, T Ou, X Tan 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 22), 2022	49	2022
Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023), 2023	31	2023
Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions V Gkatzelis, K Kollias, A Sgouritsa, X Tan 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 22), 2022	29	2022
Positive results for mechanism design without money R Cole, V Gkatzelis, G Goel Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and …, 2013	27	2013
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service V Gkatzelis, E Markakis, T Roughgarden Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation, 2017	26	2017
Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations V Gkatzelis, A Psomas, X Tan Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021	24	2021
The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games D Fotakis, V Gkatzelis, AC Kaporis, PG Spirakis Theory of Computing Systems 50 (3), 559-578, 2012	24	2012
A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching R Abebe, R Cole, V Gkatzelis, JD Hartline Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2020	22	2020
Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions S Banerjee, V Gkatzelis, S Hossain, B Jin, E Micha, N Shah 32nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023	21	2023

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