| Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs J Nagel, V San Juan, RA Mar Cognition 129 (3), 652-661, 2013 | 255 | 2013 |
| Intuitions and experiments: A defense of the case method in epistemology J Nagel Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3), 495-527, 2012 | 231 | 2012 |
| Knowledge as a mental state J Nagel Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4, 273-306, 2013 | 185 | 2013 |
| Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction J Nagel Oxford University Press, 2014 | 166 | 2014 |
| Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes J Nagel Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2), 279-294, 2008 | 160 | 2008 |
| Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism J Nagel Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1), 407-435, 2010 | 152 | 2010 |
| Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error J Nagel The Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239), 286-306, 2010 | 146 | 2010 |
| Epistemic intuitions J Nagel Philosophy Compass 2 (6), 792-819, 2007 | 116 | 2007 |
| Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution J Nagel Mind & Language 32 (5), 525-544, 2017 | 71 | 2017 |
| The reliability of epistemic intuitions K Boyd, J Nagel Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, 2012 | 67 | 2012 |
| The psychological basis of the Harman-Vogel paradox J Nagel Philosophers' Imprint 10 (15), 1-28, 2011 | 65 | 2011 |
| The social value of reasoning in epistemic justification J Nagel Episteme 12 (2), 297-308, 2015 | 49 | 2015 |
| Gendler on alief J Nagel Analysis 72 (4), 774-788, 2012 | 47 | 2012 |
| Mindreading in conversation E Westra, J Nagel Cognition, 2021 | 44 | 2021 |
| Defending the evidential value of epistemic intuitions: A reply to Stich J Nagel Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1), 179-199, 2013 | 43 | 2013 |
| Armchair‐friendly experimental philosophy K Mortensen, J Nagel A companion to experimental philosophy, 53-70, 2016 | 42 | 2016 |
| Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases J Nagel Knowledge Ascriptions, 171-191, 2012 | 41 | 2012 |
| The empiricist conception of experience J Nagel Philosophy 75 (03), 345-376, 2000 | 36 | 2000 |
| II—Intuition, reflection, and the command of knowledge J Nagel Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1), 219-241, 2014 | 34 | 2014 |
| Authentic Gettier cases: A reply to Starmans and Friedman J Nagel, R Mar, V San Juan Cognition 129 (3), 666-669, 2013 | 31 | 2013 |
Raymond A. MarYork UniversityVerified email at yorku.ca
