| Bad news for conservatives? Moral judgments and the Dark Triad personality traits: A correlational study M Arvan Neuroethics 6, 307-318, 2013 | 103 | 2013 |
| A lot more bad news for conservatives, and a little bit of bad news for liberals? Moral judgments and the dark triad personality traits: A follow-up study M Arvan Neuroethics 6, 51-64, 2013 | 62 | 2013 |
| First steps toward a nonideal theory of justice M Arvan Ethics & Global Politics 7 (3), 95-117, 2014 | 42 | 2014 |
| Rightness as Fairness M Arvan, M Arvan Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory, 153-201, 2016 | 25 | 2016 |
| The dark side of morality: Group polarization and moral epistemology M Arvan The Philosophical Forum 50 (1), 87-115, 2019 | 21 | 2019 |
| A new theory of free will M Arvan Available at SSRN 2070382, 2012 | 20 | 2012 |
| Mental time-travel, semantic flexibility, and AI ethics M Arvan AI & SOCIETY 38 (6), 2577-2596, 2023 | 19 | 2023 |
| Neurofunctional prudence and morality: A philosophical theory M Arvan Routledge, 2020 | 17 | 2020 |
| How to rationally approach life's transformative experiences M Arvan Philosophical Psychology 28 (8), 1199-1218, 2015 | 17 | 2015 |
| Nonideal justice as nonideal fairness M Arvan Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2), 208-228, 2019 | 15 | 2019 |
| Bad news for conservatives? Moral judgments and the dark triad personality traits: A correlational study. Neuroethics, 6 (2), 307–318 M Arvan Go to original source, 2013 | 15 | 2013 |
| People do not have a duty to avoid voting badly: reply to Brennan M Arvan Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (1), 1-6, 2010 | 15 | 2010 |
| A unified explanation of quantum phenomena? The case for the peer‐to‐peer simulation hypothesis as an interdisciplinary research program M Arvan | 14 | 2014 |
| Jury theorems for peer review M Arvan, LK Bright, R Heesen | 13 | 2022 |
| Morality as an evolutionary exaptation M Arvan Empirically Engaged Evolutionary Ethics, 89-109, 2021 | 10 | 2021 |
| A better, dual theory of human rights M Arvan | 9 | 2014 |
| The Peer-to-Peer Simulation Hypothesis and a New Theory of Free Will M Arvan | 8 | 2015 |
| Unifying the categorical imperative M Arvan | 7 | 2012 |
| Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments M Summers, M Arvan Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3), 496-508, 2022 | 6 | 2022 |
| Varieties of Artificial Moral Agency and the New Control Problem M Arvan | 6 | 2022 |
