Jeroen Swinkels

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Ohad KadanArizona State UniversityDirección de correo verificada de asu.edu
George J. MailathUniversity of Pennsylvania and Australian National UniversityDirección de correo verificada de econ.upenn.edu
Matthew O. JacksonWilliam D. Eberle Professor of Economics, Stanford UniversityDirección de correo verificada de stanford.edu
hector chadeRondthaler Professor of Economics, Arizona State UniversityDirección de correo verificada de asu.edu
Leslie MarxDuke UniversityDirección de correo verificada de duke.edu
Wolfgang PesendorferPrinceton UniversityDirección de correo verificada de princeton.edu
William ZameProfessor of Economics, UCLADirección de correo verificada de econ.ucla.edu
martin william crippsProfessor of Economics, University College LondonDirección de correo verificada de ucl.ac.uk
Philip RenyDepartment of Economics, University of ChicagoDirección de correo verificada de uchicago.edu

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Jeroen Swinkels

Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Dirección de correo verificada de kellogg.northwestern.edu - Página principal


Título Ordenar por citas Ordenar por año Ordenar por título	Citado por Citado por	Año
The loser's curse and information aggregation in common value auctions W Pesendorfer, JM Swinkels Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1247-1281, 1997	262	1997
Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions¹ MO Jackson, JM Swinkels Econometrica 73 (1), 93-139, 2005	210	2005
Efficiency of large double auctions MW Cripps, JM Swinkels Econometrica 74 (1), 47-92, 2006	205	2006
Efficiency of large private value auctions JM Swinkels Econometrica 69 (1), 37-68, 2001	187	2001
Communication and equilibrium in discontinuous games of incomplete information MO Jackson, LK Simon, JM Swinkels, WR Zame Econometrica 70 (5), 1711-1740, 2002	184	2002
Moral hazard with bounded payments I Jewitt, O Kadan, JM Swinkels Journal of Economic Theory 143 (1), 59-82, 2008	181	2008
Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions W Pesendorfer, JM Swinkels American Economic Review 90 (3), 499-525, 2000	181	2000
Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants JM Swinkels Journal of Economic Theory 57 (2), 306-332, 1992	178	1992
Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games JM Swinkels Games and Economic Behavior 5 (3), 455-484, 1993	165	1993
Order independence for iterated weak dominance LM Marx, JM Swinkels Games and economic behavior 18 (2), 219-245, 1997	151	1997
Education signalling with preemptive offers JM Swinkels The Review of Economic Studies 66 (4), 949-970, 1999	150	1999
Stocks or options? Moral hazard, firm viability, and the design of compensation contracts O Kadan, JM Swinkels The Review of Financial Studies 21 (1), 451-482, 2008	127	2008
Extensive form reasoning in normal form games GJ Mailath, L Samuelson, J Swinkels Foundations in Microeconomic Theory, 451, 1991	127	1991
Asymptotic efficiency for discriminatory private value auctions JM Swinkels The Review of Economic Studies 66 (3), 509-528, 1999	109	1999
Viscous population equilibria RB Myerson, GB Pollock, JM Swinkels Games and Economic Behavior 3 (1), 101-109, 1991	108	1991
Information, evolution and utility L Samuelson, JM Swinkels Theoretical Economics 1 (1), 119-142, 2006	106	2006
Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal‐agent problems O Kadan, PJ Reny, JM Swinkels Econometrica 85 (3), 769-823, 2017	60	2017
Evolution and strategic stability: from Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens JM Swinkels Journal of Economic Theory 57 (2), 333-342, 1992	59	1992
On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions V Mares, JM Swinkels Journal of Economic Theory 152, 1-40, 2014	52	2014
Optimal contracts with a risk‐taking agent D Barron, G Georgiadis, J Swinkels Theoretical Economics 15 (2), 715-761, 2020	45	2020

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