دنبال کردن
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Faculty member at the School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University
ایمیل تأیید شده در tauex.tau.ac.il - صفحهٔ اصلی
عنوان
نقل شده توسط
نقل شده توسط
سال
Simple versus optimal contracts‏
P Dütting, T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen‏
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 369-387, 2019‏
1142019
Vertex sparsifiers: New results from old techniques‏
M Englert, A Gupta, R Krauthgamer, H Racke, I Talgam-Cohen, K Talwar‏
SIAM Journal on Computing 43 (4), 1239-1262, 2014‏
912014
Optimal and robust mechanism design with interdependent values‏
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen‏
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 4 (3), 1-34, 2016‏
87*2016
Modularity and greed in double auctions‏
P Dütting, T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen‏
Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation …, 2014‏
732014
The complexity of contracts‏
P Dutting, T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen‏
SIAM Journal on Computing 50 (1), 211-254, 2021‏
722021
Strategic classification in the dark‏
G Ghalme, V Nair, I Eilat, I Talgam-Cohen, N Rosenfeld‏
International Conference on Machine Learning, 3672-3681, 2021‏
692021
Competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods and generic budgets‏
M Babaioff, N Nisan, I Talgam-Cohen‏
Mathematics of Operations Research 46 (1), 382-403, 2021‏
68*2021
Supply-limiting mechanisms‏
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen, Q Yan‏
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 844-861, 2012‏
582012
Ad auctions with data‏
H Fu, P Jordan, M Mahdian, U Nadav, I Talgam-Cohen, S Vassilvitskii‏
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 168-179, 2012‏
532012
Contracts with private cost per unit-of-effort‏
T Alon, P Dütting, I Talgam-Cohen‏
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 52-69, 2021‏
512021
The competition complexity of auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders‏
A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg‏
EC'17, 2017‏
512017
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements‏
A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg‏
Operations Research 69 (1), 188-206, 2021‏
49*2021
Multiagent evaluation mechanisms‏
T Alon, M Dobson, A Procaccia, I Talgam-Cohen, J Tucker-Foltz‏
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34 (02), 1774-1781, 2020‏
482020
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion‏
Y Babichenko, I Talgam-Cohen, H Xu, K Zabarnyi‏
Games and Economic Behavior 136, 226-248, 2022‏
452022
Approximately optimal mechanism design‏
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen‏
Annual Review of Economics 11 (1), 355-381, 2019‏
412019
Fair Allocation through Competitive Equilibrium from Generic Incomes.‏
M Babaioff, N Nisan, I Talgam-Cohen‏
ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency 19, 180, 2019‏
402019
Why prices need algorithms‏
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen‏
Proceedings of the sixteenth acm conference on economics and computation, 19-36, 2015‏
352015
Bayesian analysis of linear contracts‏
T Alon, P Dütting, Y Li, I Talgam-Cohen‏
EC'23, 2023‏
292023
Contracting with a learning agent‏
G Guruganesh, Y Kolumbus, J Schneider, I Talgam-Cohen, ...‏
arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.16198, 2024‏
282024
Algorithmic harm in consumer markets‏
O Bar-Gill, CR Sunstein, I Talgam-Cohen‏
Journal of Legal Analysis 15 (1), 1-47, 2023‏
262023
سیستم در حال حاضر قادر به انجام عملکرد نیست. بعداً دوباره امتحان کنید.
مقاله‌ها 1–20