Seuraa
Dominique Lepelley
Dominique Lepelley
professeur (émérite) de sciences économiques, CEMOI, université de La Réunion
Vahvistettu sähköpostiosoite verkkotunnuksessa univ-reunion.fr
Nimike
Viittaukset
Viittaukset
Vuosi
Voting paradoxes and group coherence: the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules
WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley
Springer Science & Business Media, 2010
2132010
On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
D Lepelley, A Louichi, H Smaoui
Social Choice and Welfare 30 (3), 363-383, 2008
1412008
Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation
P Favardin, D Lepelley, J Serais
Review of Economic Design 7, 213-228, 2002
1272002
Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
P Favardin, D Lepelley
Social Choice and Welfare 26 (3), 485-509, 2006
1012006
Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley
Springer International Publishing, 2017
882017
Voting rules, manipulability and social homogeneity
D Lepelley, F Valognes
Public Choice 116 (1), 165-184, 2003
792003
The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
D Lepelley, B Mbih
Social Choice and Welfare 11 (3), 253-265, 1994
761994
On probability models in voting theory
S Berg, D Lepelley
Statistica Neerlandica 48 (2), 133-146, 1994
731994
The probability of conflicts in a US presidential type election
MR Feix, D Lepelley, VR Merlin, JL Rouet
Economic Theory 23, 227-257 (2004), 2004
702004
Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
D Lepelley, V Merlin
Economic Theory 17, 53-80, 2001
612001
The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
D Lepelley, B Mbih
Economics Letters 24 (4), 311-315, 1987
601987
On the probability of electing the Condorcet
D Lepelley
Mathematical Social Sciences 25 (2), 105-116, 1993
511993
The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
D Lepelley, F Chantreuil, S Berg
Mathematical Social Sciences 31 (3), 133-146, 1996
481996
La mesure du pouvoir de vote
NG Andjiga, F Chantreuil, D Lepelley
Mathématiques et sciences humaines. Mathematics and social sciences, 2003
462003
The Condorcet efficiency of Borda rule with anonymous voters
WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley
Mathematical Social Sciences 41 (1), 39-50, 2001
392001
The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley
Journal of Mathematical Economics 29 (3), 271-283, 1998
391998
On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members
MR Feix, D Lepelley, VR Merlin, JL Rouet
Social Choice and Welfare 28 (2), 181-207, 2007
352007
On some limitations of the median voting rule
WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley
Public Choice 117, 177-190, 2003
342003
Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
D Lepelley, P Pierron, F Valognes
Theory and Decision 49 (2), 175-196, 2000
322000
Majority efficient representation of the citizens in a federal union
M Feix, D Lepelley, V Merlin, JL Rouet, L Vidu
Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models: Essays by and in Honor of …, 2021
282021
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