Artikel dengan mandat akses publik - Maria KyropoulouPelajari lebih lanjut
Tersedia di suatu tempat: 12
Blockchain mining games
A Kiayias, E Koutsoupias, M Kyropoulou, Y Tselekounis
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 365-382, 2016
Mandat: European Commission
Almost envy-freeness in group resource allocation
M Kyropoulou, W Suksompong, AA Voudouris
Theoretical Computer Science 841, 110-123, 2020
Mandat: European Commission
The VCG mechanism for Bayesian scheduling
Y Giannakopoulos, M Kyropoulou
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 5 (4), 1-16, 2017
Mandat: UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, European Commission
Fair cake-cutting in practice
M Kyropoulou, J Ortega, E Segal-Halevi
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM conference on economics and computation, 547-548, 2019
Mandat: European Commission
The anarchy of scheduling without money
Y Giannakopoulos, E Koutsoupias, M Kyropoulou
Theoretical Computer Science 778, 19-32, 2019
Mandat: UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, European Commission …
Revenue guarantees in the generalized second price auction
I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT) 14 (2-3), 17, 2014
Mandat: European Commission
On interim envy-free allocation lotteries
I Caragiannis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 264-284, 2021
Mandat: European Commission
Limitations of deterministic auction design for correlated bidders
I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, M Kyropoulou
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT) 8 (4), 1-18, 2016
Mandat: European Commission
Multi-agent systems for computational economics and finance
M Kampouridis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou, T Melissourgos, ...
AI Communications 35 (4), 369-380, 2022
Mandat: UK Economic and Social Research Council, UK Research & Innovation
Interim Envy-Freeness: A New Fairness Concept for Random Allocations
I CARAGIANNIS, P KANELLOPOULOS, M KYROPOULOU
arXiv preprint arXiv:2102.07839, 2021
Mandat: European Commission
The VCG mechanism for Bayesian scheduling
M Kyropoulou, Y Giannakopoulos
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 5 (4), 2017
Mandat: UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, European Commission
Limitations of deterministic auction design for correlated bidders
M Kyropoulou, I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory, 2016
Mandat: European Commission
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