| Lockeans maximize expected accuracy K Dorst Mind 128 (509), 175–211, 2019 | 134 | 2019 |
| Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain K Dorst Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3), 586-632, 2020 | 81* | 2020 |
| Rational polarization K Dorst Philosophical Review 132 (3), 355-458, 2023 | 58* | 2023 |
| Good guesses K Dorst, M Mandelkern Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3), 581-618, 2022 | 51 | 2022 |
| Abominable KK Failures K Dorst Mind, 0 | 40* | |
| Higher-Order Uncertainty K Dorst Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, 0 | 40* | |
| Assertion is weak M Mandelkern, K Dorst | 36 | 2022 |
| Deference done better K Dorst, BA Levinstein, B Salow, BE Husic, B Fitelson Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1), 99-150, 2021 | 26 | 2021 |
| Why rational people polarize K Dorst | 12 | 2019 |
| Higher-order evidence K Dorst The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, 176-194, 2020 | 11 | 2020 |
| The rational question K Dorst The Oxonian Review, 2020 | 7 | 2020 |
| Reasonably polarized: Why politics is more rational than you think K Dorst Psychology today, accessed June 5, 2023, 2020 | 6 | 2020 |
| Being Rational and Being Wrong K Dorst | 5 | 2023 |
| Can the Knowledge Norm Co‐Opt the Opt Out? K Dorst Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4), 273-282, 2014 | 4 | 2014 |
| (Almost) all evidence is higher-order evidence B Hedden, K Dorst Analysis 82 (3), 417-425, 2022 | 3 | 2022 |
| Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy K Dorst Available at SSRN 4683064, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
| Splitting the (In) Difference: Why Fine-Tuning Supports Design C Dorst, K Dorst Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2022 | 2* | 2022 |
| Modest epistemology KKM Dorst Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2019 | 2 | 2019 |
| The conjunction fallacy: confirmation or relevance? WJ Chung, K Dorst, M Mandelkern, S Mascarenhas Thinking & Reasoning, 1-27, 2024 | 1 | 2024 |
| Be modest: you're living on the edge K Dorst Analysis 81 (4), 611-621, 2021 | 1 | 2021 |
Matthew MandelkernAssociate Professor, NYU Department of Philosophynyu.edu의 이메일 확인됨