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Joel Sobel
Joel Sobel
Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego
Verifisert e-postadresse på ucsd.edu - Startside
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Strategic information transmission
VP Crawford, J Sobel
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1431-1451, 1982
62801982
Can we trust social capital?
J Sobel
Journal of economic literature 40 (1), 139-154, 2002
18332002
Equilibrium selection in signaling games
JS Banks, J Sobel
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 647-661, 1987
14661987
Interdependent preferences and reciprocity
J Sobel
Journal of economic literature 43 (2), 392-436, 2005
12842005
A theory of credibility
J Sobel
The Review of Economic Studies 52 (4), 557-573, 1985
9371985
Lying aversion and the size of the lie
U Gneezy, A Kajackaite, J Sobel
American Economic Review 108 (2), 419-453, 2018
5952018
Samurai accountant: A theory of auditing and plunder
KC Border, J Sobel
The Review of economic studies 54 (4), 525-540, 1987
5751987
A multistage model of bargaining
J Sobel, I Takahashi
The Review of Economic Studies 50 (3), 411-426, 1983
5591983
Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
IK Cho, J Sobel
Journal of Economic Theory 50 (2), 381-413, 1990
5271990
Cyclic pricing by a durable goods monopolist
J Conlisk, E Gerstner, J Sobel
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 99 (3), 489-505, 1984
5001984
The timing of sales
J Sobel
The Review of Economic Studies 51 (3), 353-368, 1984
3861984
Selecting cheap‐talk equilibria
Y Chen, N Kartik, J Sobel
Econometrica 76 (1), 117-136, 2008
3512008
Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies
I Sanchez, J Sobel
Journal of public economics 50 (3), 345-369, 1993
2841993
Durable goods monopoly with entry of new consumers
J Sobel
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1455-1485, 1991
2441991
Giving and receiving advice
J Sobel
Advances in economics and econometrics 1, 305-341, 2013
2372013
Signaling games
J Sobel
Complex social and behavioral systems: Game theory and agent-based models …, 2020
2332020
Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings
U Segal, J Sobel
Journal of Economic Theory 136 (1), 197-216, 2007
2242007
Other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium
M Dufwenberg, P Heidhues, G Kirchsteiger, F Riedel, J Sobel
The Review of Economic Studies 78 (2), 613-639, 2011
2172011
Signalling
DM Kreps, J Sobel
Handbook of game theory with economic applications 2, 849-867, 1994
2161994
An evolutionary approach to pre-play communication
YG Kim, J Sobel
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1181-1193, 1995
2101995
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Artikler 1–20