The administrative foundations of self-enforcing constitutions Y González de Lara, A Greif, S Jha American Economic Review 98 (2), 105-109, 2008 | 107 | 2008 |
The secret of Venetian success: a public-order, reputation-based institution YG De Lara European review of economic history 12 (3), 247-285, 2008 | 102 | 2008 |
Institutions for Contract Enforcements and Risk-sharing: From Debt to Equity in Late Medieval Venice Y Gonzalez de_Lara Banca d'Italia, 2004 | 28* | 2004 |
Enforceability and risk-sharing in financial contracts: From the sea loan to the commenda in late Medieval Venice YG De Lara The Journal of Economic History 61 (2), 500-504, 2001 | 23 | 2001 |
Institutions for contract enforcement and risk-sharing: From the sea loan to the commenda in late medieval Venice YG De Lara European Review of Economic History 6 (2), 257-262, 2002 | 11 | 2002 |
Respuestas contractuales a cambios institucionales: un análisis histórico institucional YG de Lara ICE, Revista de Economía, 2004 | 8 | 2004 |
Litigation Plus Regulation: The Protection of Investor Rights in Late-Medieval Venice (w:) Origins of Shareholder Advocacy, ed Y González de Lara JGs Koppell, new York, 101-122, 2011 | 6 | 2011 |
Business organization and organizational innovation in late Medieval Italy YG de Lara Research Handbook on the History of Corporate and Company Law, 65-87, 2018 | 5 | 2018 |
The birth of insurance contracts Y González de Lara Working paper. University of Alicante, 2005 | 5 | 2005 |
El uso de experimentos como método de aprendizaje activo en cursos de iniciación a la Economía Y González de Lara @ tic. revista d'innovació educativa 8, 26-32, 2012 | 4* | 2012 |
Self-enforcing, public-order institutions for contract enforcement: litigation, regulation, and limited government in Venice, 1050–1350 YG de Lara Political economy of institutions, democracy and voting, 95-117, 2011 | 4 | 2011 |
Enforceability and Risk-sharing in Financial Contracts: from the Sea Loan to the Commenda in late Medieval Venice Y González de Lara European University Institute, 2000 | 4 | 2000 |
Institutions, information, and contracts: from debt to equity in late medieval Venice Y GONZ ALEZ DE LARA Mimeo. Stanford University and University of Alicante, 2007 | 3 | 2007 |
The secret of venetian success: Public-order yet reputation-based institutions YG de Lara XIV International Economic History Congress, 2006 | 3 | 2006 |
The secret of venetian success: the role of the state in financial markets YG de Lara Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, 2005 | 3 | 2005 |
Changes in Information and Optimal Debt Contracts: The Sea Loan YG De Lara European University Institute, 1997 | 1 | 1997 |
Changes in information and optimal debt contracts: the sea loan Y Gonzalez de Lara European University Institute, 1997 | 1 | 1997 |
EL SECRETO DEL ÉXITO DE VENECIA: UNA INSTITUCIÓN DE ORDEN PÚBLICO BASADA EN LA REPUTACIÓN1 YG de Lara Economía política desde Estambul a Potosí: Ciudades estado, imperios y …, 2012 | | 2012 |
Litigation Plus Regulation: The Protection of Investor Rights in Late-Medieval Venice YG de Lara Origins of Shareholder Advocacy, 101-122, 2011 | | 2011 |
The familiarity of strangers: the Sephardic diaspora, Livorno, and cross‐cultural trade in the early modern period–By Francesca Trivellato YG De Lara The Economic History Review 63 (2), 553-554, 2010 | | 2010 |