| Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem J Hörner, T Sugaya, S Takahashi, N Vieille Econometrica 79 (4), 1277-1318, 2011 | 137 | 2011 |
| Folk theorem in repeated games with private monitoring T Sugaya The Review of Economic Studies 89 (4), 2201-2256, 2022 | 104 | 2022 |
| Measuring the incentive to collude: the vitamin cartels, 1990–99 M Igami, T Sugaya The Review of Economic Studies 89 (3), 1460-1494, 2022 | 87* | 2022 |
| Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games R Calcagno, Y Kamada, S Lovo, T Sugaya Theoretical Economics 9 (2), 409-434, 2014 | 66* | 2014 |
| The revelation principle in multistage games T Sugaya, A Wolitzky The Review of Economic Studies 88 (3), 1503-1540, 2021 | 58 | 2021 |
| Maintaining privacy in cartels T Sugaya, A Wolitzky Journal of Political Economy 126 (6), 2569-2607, 2018 | 48 | 2018 |
| Market competition and political influence: An integrated approach S Callander, D Foarta, T Sugaya Econometrica 90 (6), 2723-2753, 2022 | 41 | 2022 |
| The folk theorem in repeated games with anonymous random matching J Deb, T Sugaya, A Wolitzky Econometrica 88 (3), 917-964, 2020 | 34 | 2020 |
| Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring T Sugaya, A Wolitzky Theoretical Economics 12 (2), 691-729, 2017 | 33* | 2017 |
| Optimal timing of policy announcements in dynamic election campaigns Y Kamada, T Sugaya The Quarterly Journal of Economics 135 (3), 1725-1797, 2020 | 27* | 2020 |
| Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring T Sugaya, S Takahashi Journal of Economic Theory 148 (5), 1891-1928, 2013 | 23 | 2013 |
| Communication and community enforcement T Sugaya, A Wolitzky Journal of Political Economy 129 (9), 2595-2628, 2021 | 20 | 2021 |
| Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting T Sugaya Theoretical Economics 10 (3), 691-717, 2015 | 19 | 2015 |
| The dynamics of a policy outcome: market response and bureaucratic enforcement of a policy change S Callander, D Foarta, T Sugaya American Journal of Political Science 68 (4), 1252-1265, 2024 | 16 | 2024 |
| A few bad apples spoil the barrel: An Anti-folk Theorem for anonymous repeated games with incomplete information T Sugaya, A Wolitzky American Economic Review 110 (12), 3817-3835, 2020 | 16 | 2020 |
| Common learning and cooperation in repeated games T Sugaya, Y Yamamoto Theoretical Economics 15 (3), 1175-1219, 2020 | 16* | 2020 |
| Dynamic Campaign Spending A Acharya, E Grillo, T Sugaya, E Turkel URL: http://stanford. edu/avidit/campaigns. pdf, 2019 | 15* | 2019 |
| Belief-free review-strategy equilibrium without conditional independence T Sugaya Unpublished paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business.[1180], 2012 | 13 | 2012 |
| Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting T Sugaya Princeton University, 2010 | 11 | 2010 |
| Wait-and-see or step in? dynamics of interventions D Foarta, T Sugaya American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (1), 399-425, 2021 | 9* | 2021 |
Alexander WolitzkyProfessor of Economics, MITПодтвержден адрес электронной почты в домене mit.edu
