| Responsive affirmative action in school choice B Doğan Journal of Economic Theory 165, 69-105, 2016 | 86 | 2016 |
| Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application B Doğan, B Klaus Journal of Mathematical Economics 79, 140-156, 2018 | 35 | 2018 |
| Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism B Doğan, L Ehlers American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14 (4), 556-82, 2022 | 31 | 2022 |
| Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance B Doğan, L Ehlers Theoretical Economics 16 (4), 1249-1279, 2021 | 27* | 2021 |
| Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago B Doğan, MB Yenmez Games and Economic Behavior 118, 366-373, 2019 | 26* | 2019 |
| Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems B Doğan, K Yıldız Games and Economic Behavior 95, 47-58, 2016 | 23 | 2016 |
| Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints B Doğan, S Doğan, K Yıldız Journal of Public Economic Theory 23 (1), 172-196, 2021 | 19 | 2021 |
| When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? B Doğan, MB Yenmez Economic Theory 76 (4), 1145-1173, 2023 | 15* | 2023 |
| How to control controlled school choice: Comment B Doğan American Economic Review 107 (4), 1362-1364, 2017 | 14 | 2017 |
| Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents B Dogan Journal of Mathematical Economics 73, 103-110, 2017 | 14* | 2017 |
| Choice with affirmative action B Doğan, K Yildiz Management Science 69 (4), 2284-2296, 2023 | 13 | 2023 |
| On capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules B Doğan, S Doğan, K Yıldız Mathematics of Operations Research 46 (3), 856-868, 2021 | 11 | 2021 |
| A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism B Doğan, S Doğan, K Yıldız Journal of Economic Theory 175, 178-200, 2018 | 11 | 2018 |
| Explorations on monotonicity in social choice theory B Doğan PQDT-Global, 2007 | 7 | 2007 |
| Choice and market design S Alva, B Dogan arXiv preprint arXiv:2110.15446, 2021 | 6 | 2021 |
| Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems WJ Cho, B Doğan Economics Letters 146, 8-12, 2016 | 6 | 2016 |
| Existence of myopic-farsighted stable sets in matching markets B Dogan, L Ehlers Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 536-536, 2023 | 5 | 2023 |
| Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism B Doğan, MB Yenmez Economic Theory Bulletin 8, 125-137, 2020 | 5 | 2020 |
| Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies B Doğan Games and Economic Behavior 98, 165-171, 2016 | 5 | 2016 |
| Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking B Doğan, K Imamura, MB Yenmez arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.06777, 2022 | 4 | 2022 |
Kemal YildizBilkent UniversityПідтверджена електронна адреса в bilkent.edu.tr
