The field of optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, as well
as several killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from …

We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with
combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by …

Posted price mechanisms constitute a widely used way of selling items to strategic
consumers. Although suboptimal, the attractiveness of these mechanisms comes from their …

Over the past decade, an exciting connection has developed between the theory of posted-
price mechanisms and the prophet inequality, a result from the theory of optimal stop** …

RegretNet is a recent breakthrough in the automated design of revenue-maximizing
auctions. It combines the flexibility of deep learning with the regret-based approach to relax …

In the classic prophet inequality, a well-known problem in optimal stop** theory, samples
from independent random variables (possibly differently distributed) arrive online. A gambler …

We study the allocative challenges that governmental and nonprofit organizations face when
tasked with equitable and efficient rationing of a social good among agents whose needs …

Motivated by online decision-making in time-varying combinatorial environments, we study
the problem of transforming offline algorithms to their online counterparts. We focus on …

Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central
problem in Auction Design. Theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits in …

In this work we prove that designing PPMs is equivalent to finding stop** rules for
prophets. This extends the connection that any prophet type inequality can be turned into a …