We examine whether information about firms' directors' and officers'(D&O) liability insurance
coverage provides insights into the likelihood of shareholder lawsuits. Using Canadian …

In an article announcing the retirement of Bill Lerach, the famous and widely reviled
plaintiffs' lawyer, the Wall Street Journal concisely summarized the debate surrounding …

We study whether and how financial reporting concerns are priced by insurers that sell
Directors' and Officers'(D&O) insurance to public firms. As D&O insurers typically assume the …

Corporate directors are liable for the corporation's actions as well as their own. Strangely,
and by far, the most likely plaintiffs in a lawsuit against corporate directors are the …

The fundamental idea of directors' and officers'(D&O) liability insurance is to provide liability
protection to boards of directors and executive officers against accusations of wrongful acts …

We examine whether Directors and Officers (D&O) Insurance purchases around equity
issues is priced information. Our results support the managerial opportunism hypothesis that …

We examine the relation between the managerial opportunism embedded in earnings
management, and D&O insurance. We investigate (a) whether managers are more willing to …

We examine corporate purchases of Directors and Officers (D&O) liability insurance and find
that in addition to governance quality it contains managers' private information. In particular …

This article introduces a new rationale for the existence of “directors' and officers”(D&O)
insurance. We use a model with volatile stock markets where shareholders design …

This paper investigates the effects of directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance on
default risk. Using unique panel data of non-financial listed firms in Taiwan from 2010 to …