Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring | The Review of Economic Studies |
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In this paper, I offer two ways in which firms can collude: secret monitoring and infrequent
coordination. Such collusion is enforceable with intuitive communication protocols. I make …

We study an infinitely repeated principal-agent model with subjective evaluations. We
compare the surplus in efficiency-wage equilibria and in bonus-payments equilibria. The …

We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by
observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions …

Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring have a wide range of applications, but a
complete characterization of all equilibria in this class of games has yet to be obtained. The …

The theory of repeated games models situations in which a group of agents engage in a
strategic interaction over and over. The data of the strategic interaction is fixed over time and …

Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We
investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private …

We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation
when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class …

This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-
strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of …

This paper extends the belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with
asymmetric private monitoring. We first find that the previous belief-based techniques [T …