Formal models of nondemocratic politics

S Gehlbach, K Sonin, MW Svolik - Annual Review of Political …, 2016 - annualreviews.org
The last decade has witnessed growing interest among political scientists and economists in
nondemocratic politics. This trend has been reflected in increasingly rigorous game …

Informational autocrats

S Guriev, D Treisman - Journal of economic perspectives, 2019 - aeaweb.org
In recent decades, dictatorships based on mass repression have largely given way to a new
model based on the manipulation of information. Instead of terrorizing citizens into …

A theory of informational autocracy

S Guriev, D Treisman - Journal of public economics, 2020 - Elsevier
We develop an informational theory of autocracy. Dictators survive not by means of force or
ideology but because they convince the public—rightly or wrongly—that they are competent …

Transparency, protest, and autocratic instability

JR Hollyer, BP Rosendorff… - American Political Science …, 2015 - cambridge.org
The collapse of autocratic regimes is often brought about through large-scale mobilization
and collective action by elements of the populace. The willingness of any given member of …

State censorship

M Shadmehr, D Bernhardt - American Economic Journal …, 2015 - aeaweb.org
We characterize a ruler's decision of whether to censor media reports that convey
information to citizens who decide whether to revolt. We find:(i) a ruler gains (his ex ante …

Propaganda and credulity

AT Little - Games and Economic Behavior, 2017 - Elsevier
I develop a theory of propaganda which affects mass behavior without necessarily affecting
mass beliefs. A group of citizens observe a signal of their government's performance, which …

Collective action with uncertain payoffs: coordination, public signals, and punishment dilemmas

M Shadmehr, D Bernhardt - American Political Science Review, 2011 - cambridge.org
How can one analyze collective action in protests or revolutions when individuals are
uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution? We model a “calculus …

Deliver the vote! Micromotives and macrobehavior in electoral fraud

A Rundlett, MW Svolik - American Political Science Review, 2016 - cambridge.org
Most electoral fraud is not conducted centrally by incumbents but rather locally by a
multitude of political operatives. How does an incumbent ensure that his agents deliver fraud …

Why do authoritarian regimes allow citizens to voice opinions publicly?

J Chen, Y Xu - The Journal of Politics, 2017 - journals.uchicago.edu
Why would an authoritarian regime allow citizens to voice opinions publicly if the exchange
of information among citizens spurs social instability as has been often alleged? We show …

[BOOK][B] Transparency, democracy, and autocracy: economic transparency and political (in) stability

JR Hollyer, BP Rosendorff, JR Vreeland - 2018 - books.google.com
Advocates for economic development often call for greater transparency. But what does
transparency really mean? What are its consequences? This breakthrough book …