Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to
simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of …

When coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional
bias in agents' non-best response behavior, we show that the Egalitarian bargaining …

We study the long-run conventions emerging in a stag-hunt game when agents are myopic
best responders. Our main novel assumption is that errors converge to zero at a rate that is …

Division of labor is a widely studied subject of collective behavior in natural systems. It is
concerned with the question of how the regulation of the division of labor may contribute to …

In this paper we study the typical dilemma of social coordination between a risk-dominant
convention and a payoff-dominant convention. In particular, we consider a model where a …

We introduce evolutionary dynamics for two-action games where agents with diverse
preferences use statistical inference to guide their behavior. We show that the dynamic …

This paper investigates the role of loss-aversion in affecting the long-run equilibria of
stochastic evolutionary dynamics. We consider a finite population of loss-averse agents who …

In this paper, we consider evolutionary games and construct a model of replicator dynamics
with bounded continuously distributed time delay. In many circumstances, players interact …

This paper investigates stochastic stability of noisy best response dynamics with reference-
dependent preferences. We define a strategy as super-dominant in a 2× 2 coordination …

We consider the long-run outcomes of bargaining games when players obey prospect
theory. We extend the evolutionary bargaining model of Young (1993) to a two-stage Nash …