The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by
considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as …

Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our first-and
higher-order attitudes. They claim that rationality often permits a range of doxastic responses …

Sometimes, we face choices between actions most likely to lead to valuable outcomes, and
actions which put us in a better position to learn. These choices exemplify what is called the …

Finite agents such as human beings have reasoning and updating processes that are
extended in time; consequently, there is always some lag between the point at which we …

In this paper, I motivate a puzzle about epistemic rationality. On the one hand, there seems
to be something problematic about frequently changing your mind. On the other hand …

Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the
agent's states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden, 2016; Moss]; others argue that all …

In this paper I investigate whether there are any cases in which it is rational for a person to
hold inconsistent beliefs and, if there are, just what implications this might have for the theory …

When we think about agents who change a long-standing belief, we sometimes have
conflicting reactions. On the one hand, such agents often epistemically improve. For …

Epistemic permissivism says that sometimes there are multiple rational responses to the
same body of evidence. A recent argument against permissivism says that this view is …

Epistemologists who study credences have a well-developed account of how you should
change them when you learn new evidence; that is, when your body of evidence grows …