Anticipating litigation in contract design

RE Scott, GG Triantis - Yale LJ, 2005 - HeinOnline
Contract theory does not address the question of how parties design contracts under the
existing adversarial system, which relies on the parties to establish relevant facts indirectly …

Solomon's knot: how law can end the poverty of nations

RD Cooter, HB Schäfer - Solomon's Knot, 2011 - degruyter.com
Sustained growth depends on innovation, whether it's cutting-edge software from Silicon
Valley, an improved assembly line in Sichuan, or a new export market for Swaziland's …

Preponderance of evidence

D Demougin, C Fluet - European Economic Review, 2006 - Elsevier
This paper investigates the incentive properties of the standard of proof for a finding of
negligence when evidence about injurers' behavior is imperfect. We show that a “more-likely …

Deterrence versus judicial error: A comparative view of standards of proof

D Demougin, C Fluet - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics …, 2005 - JSTOR
We argue that the common-law standard of proof, given the rules of evidence, does not
minimize expected error as usually argued in the legal literature, but may well be efficient …

Rules of proof, courts, and incentives

D Demougin, C Fluet - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008 - Wiley Online Library
We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision making in civil
litigation. The objective is the provision of incentives for potential tort‐feasors to exert care …

Partnering: definition, theory and evaluation

J Nyström - 2007 - diva-portal.org
The concept of partnering in the construction industry stands for a collaborative way of
working. Examples of partnering projects can be found on every continent. As suggested in …

The inquisitorial and the adversarial procedure in a criminal court setting

B Deffains, D Demougin - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics …, 2008 - JSTOR
We provide a comparison of the adversarial and inquisitorial trial procedures. We find that
social costs associated with a given level of justice are always smaller under the adversarial …

Crime, credible enforcement, and multiple equilibria

MJ Baker, TJ Miceli - International Review of Law and Economics, 2021 - Elsevier
This paper examines the credibility of threats to punish criminal offenders. The motivation is
the sequential nature of crime and punishment, which unfolds as follows: enforcers threaten …

Liability rules under evidentiary uncertainty

C Fluet - International Review of Law and Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper characterizes the efficient evidentiary thresholds for establishing negligence
when courts have imperfect evidence about care. An evidentiary threshold refers to the …

Truth-revealing mechanisms for courts

R Cooter, W Emons - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics …, 2003 - JSTOR
In trials witnesses often slant their testimony in order to advance their own interests. To
obtain truthful testimony, the law relies on cross-examination under threat of prosecution for …