Auction mechanisms for virtualization in 5G cellular networks: Basics, trends, and open challenges

U Habiba, E Hossain - IEEE communications surveys & …, 2018 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Wireless network virtualization (WNV) is considered as a reliable and effective solution to
enhance the capacity and resource utilization in emerging 5G cellular wireless networks …

A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer

M Babaioff, N Immorlica, B Lucier… - Journal of the ACM …, 2020 - dl.acm.org
We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …

Bayesian combinatorial auctions: Expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers

S Alaei - SIAM Journal on Computing, 2014 - SIAM
We present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem
for multiple agents to single agent subproblems in the context of Bayesian combinatorial …

Bayesian mechanism design

JD Hartline - … and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science, 2013 - nowpublishers.com
Abstract Systems wherein strategic agents compete for limited resources are ubiquitous: the
economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming …

Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization

Y Cai, C Daskalakis… - 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual …, 2012 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in
multidimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary-possibly combinatorial-feasibility …

An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms

Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg - … of the forty-fourth annual ACM …, 2012 - dl.acm.org
We show that every feasible, Bayesian, multi-item multi-bidder mechanism for independent,
additive bidders can be implemented as a mechanism that:(a) allocates every item …

[PDF][PDF] Deep learning for revenue-optimal auctions with budgets

Z Feng, H Narasimhan… - Proceedings of the 17th …, 2018 - aamas.csc.liv.ac.uk
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions for settings with private budgets is a hard task.
Even the single-item case is not fully understood, and there are no analytical results for …

Privacy preserving and cost optimal mobile crowdsensing using smart contracts on blockchain

D Chatzopoulos, S Gujar, B Faltings… - 2018 IEEE 15th …, 2018 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
The popularity and applicability of mobile crowdsensing applications are continuously
increasing due to the widespread of mobile devices and their sensing and processing …

The complexity of optimal mechanism design

C Daskalakis, A Deckelbaum, C Tzamos - … of the twenty-fifth annual ACM …, 2014 - SIAM
Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for
selling one item to multiple bidders [18]. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at …

[PDF][PDF] Mechanism design and approximation

JD Hartline - Book draft. October, 2013 - jasonhartline.com
This text provides a look at select topics in economic mechanism design through the lens of
approximation. It reviews the classical economic theory of mechanism design wherein a …