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Auction mechanisms for virtualization in 5G cellular networks: Basics, trends, and open challenges
Wireless network virtualization (WNV) is considered as a reliable and effective solution to
enhance the capacity and resource utilization in emerging 5G cellular wireless networks …
enhance the capacity and resource utilization in emerging 5G cellular wireless networks …
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer
We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …
Bayesian combinatorial auctions: Expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers
S Alaei - SIAM Journal on Computing, 2014 - SIAM
We present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem
for multiple agents to single agent subproblems in the context of Bayesian combinatorial …
for multiple agents to single agent subproblems in the context of Bayesian combinatorial …
Bayesian mechanism design
JD Hartline - … and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science, 2013 - nowpublishers.com
Abstract Systems wherein strategic agents compete for limited resources are ubiquitous: the
economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming …
economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming …
Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization
Y Cai, C Daskalakis… - 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual …, 2012 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in
multidimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary-possibly combinatorial-feasibility …
multidimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary-possibly combinatorial-feasibility …
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
We show that every feasible, Bayesian, multi-item multi-bidder mechanism for independent,
additive bidders can be implemented as a mechanism that:(a) allocates every item …
additive bidders can be implemented as a mechanism that:(a) allocates every item …
[PDF][PDF] Deep learning for revenue-optimal auctions with budgets
Z Feng, H Narasimhan… - Proceedings of the 17th …, 2018 - aamas.csc.liv.ac.uk
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions for settings with private budgets is a hard task.
Even the single-item case is not fully understood, and there are no analytical results for …
Even the single-item case is not fully understood, and there are no analytical results for …
Privacy preserving and cost optimal mobile crowdsensing using smart contracts on blockchain
The popularity and applicability of mobile crowdsensing applications are continuously
increasing due to the widespread of mobile devices and their sensing and processing …
increasing due to the widespread of mobile devices and their sensing and processing …
The complexity of optimal mechanism design
C Daskalakis, A Deckelbaum, C Tzamos - … of the twenty-fifth annual ACM …, 2014 - SIAM
Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for
selling one item to multiple bidders [18]. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at …
selling one item to multiple bidders [18]. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at …
[PDF][PDF] Mechanism design and approximation
JD Hartline - Book draft. October, 2013 - jasonhartline.com
This text provides a look at select topics in economic mechanism design through the lens of
approximation. It reviews the classical economic theory of mechanism design wherein a …
approximation. It reviews the classical economic theory of mechanism design wherein a …