This paper studies a dynamic principal–agent setting in which the principal needs to
dynamically schedule an agent to work or be suspended. When the agent is directed to work …

We study dynamic contracts that incentivize an agent to exert effort to increase the arrival
rate of a Poisson process, where both the effort cost and the effort level at any time are the …

We study a dynamic contract design problem under the risks of external shocks, including
job destruction and outside options. In our model, a principal hires an agent to increase …

We consider a stylized incentive management problem over an infinite time horizon, where
the principal hires an agent to provide services to customers. Customers request service in …

This paper concerns the design of a performance-based compensation scheme (or a
“contract”) for a company that outsources customer service to a third-party service provider …

This paper studies a dynamic principal-agent setting in which the principal needs to
dynamically schedule an agent to work or rest. When the agent is motivated to work, the …

We study dynamic contracts that incentivize an agent to exert effort to increase the arrival
rate of a Poisson arrival (breakthrough), where both the effort cost and the effort level at any …