In this work we introduce an alternative model for the design and analysis of strategyproof
mechanisms that is motivated by the recent surge of work in" learning-augmented …

In the strategic facility location problem, a set of agents report their locations in a metric
space and the goal is to use these reports to open a new facility, minimizing an aggregate …

We consider a single-facility location problem, where agents are positioned on the real line
and are partitioned into multiple disjoint districts. The goal is to choose a location (where a …

We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources.
We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line …

The facility location game is an extensively studied problem in mechanism design. In the
classical model, the cost of each agent is her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we …

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the
facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based …

We study the distributed facility location problem, where a set of agents with positions on the
line of real numbers are partitioned into disjoint districts, and the goal is to choose a point to …

We revisit the discrete heterogeneous two-facility location problem, in which there is a set of
agents that occupy nodes of a line graph and have private approval preferences over two …

Mechanism Design seeks to establish protocols for aggregating the private information of a
set of agents to optimize a global objective. Nonetheless, optimizing a communal goal solely …

The facility location with strategic agents is a canonical problem in the literature on
mechanism design without money. Recently, Agrawal et. al. considered this problem in the …