This paper studies a model of long-term contracting for experimentation. We consider a
principal–agent relationship with adverse selection on the agent's ability, dynamic moral …

We study contests for innovation with learning about the innovation's feasibility and
opponents' outcomes. We characterize contests that maximize innovation when the designer …

I study a dynamic relationship where a principal delegates experimentation to an agent.
Experimentation is modeled as a one-armed bandit that yields successes following a …

This study explores the association between firm innovation and loan covenant strictness.
We find that lenders construct stricter contracts for firms filing more patents, consistent with …

We study the design of approval rules when experimentation must be delegated to an agent
with misaligned preferences with an application to FDA decision rules. Consider a dynamic …

Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its
profitability. We model this learning as a two-armed bandit problem and highlight the …

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to develop a workforce optimisation model that
maximises the profitability of a knowledge-based service organisation in the quaternary …

I study optimal contracting in a model in which a principal hires an agent in order to
experiment on a project of unknown quality. The principal provides the resources needed for …

I study a continuous-time moral hazard problem with learning about a two-stage project of
unknown quality. The first-stage arrival time is informative but not conclusive about the …

This paper studies how reduced oversight creates an incentive for process innovation. With
incomplete contracts, tight monitoring of workers creates a ratchet effect of innovation. Under …