Failure-aware kidney exchange

JP Dickerson, AD Procaccia, T Sandholm - Proceedings of the fourteenth …, 2013 - dl.acm.org
Most algorithmic matches in fielded kidney exchanges do not result in an actual transplant.
In this paper, we address the problem of cycles and chains in a proposed match failing after …

Free riding and participation in large scale, multi‐hospital kidney exchange

I Ashlagi, AE Roth - Theoretical Economics, 2014 - Wiley Online Library
As multi‐hospital kidney exchange has grown, the set of players has grown from patients
and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals can choose to enroll only their hard‐to‐match …

[PDF][PDF] Optimizing kidney exchange with transplant chains: Theory and reality

JP Dickerson, AD Procaccia, T Sandholm - Proceedings of the 11th …, 2012 - cs.cmu.edu
Kidney exchange, where needy patients swap incompatible donors with each other, offers a
lifesaving alternative to waiting for an organ from the deceased-donor waiting list. Recently …

Dynamic matching via weighted myopia with application to kidney exchange

J Dickerson, A Procaccia, T Sandholm - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2012 - ojs.aaai.org
In many dynamic matching applications—especially high-stakes ones—the competitive
ratios of prior-free online algorithms are unacceptably poor. The algorithm should take …

[PDF][PDF] Price of fairness in kidney exchange

JP Dickerson, AD Procaccia… - Proceedings of the 2014 …, 2014 - jpdickerson.com
Kidney exchange provides a life-saving alternative to long waiting lists for patients in need of
a new kidney. Fielded exchanges typically match under utilitarian or near-utilitarian rules; …

Paired and altruistic kidney donation in the UK: Algorithms and experimentation

DF Manlove, G O'malley - Journal of Experimental Algorithmics (JEA), 2015 - dl.acm.org
We study the computational problem of identifying optimal sets of kidney exchanges in the
UK. We show how to expand an integer programming-based formulation due to Roth et …

A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program

M Carvalho, A Lodi - European Journal of Operational Research, 2023 - Elsevier
A main aim of kidney exchange programs (KEPs) is to maximize the number of transplants
within a pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs by exchanging donors. A KEP involving …

Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange

I Ashlagi, F Fischer, IA Kash, AD Procaccia - Games and Economic …, 2015 - Elsevier
As kidney exchange programs are growing, manipulation by hospitals becomes more of an
issue. Assuming that hospitals wish to maximize the number of their own patients who …

The need for (long) chains in kidney exchange

I Ashlagi, D Gamarnik, MA Rees, AE Roth - 2012 - nber.org
It has been previously shown that for sufficiently large pools of patient-donor pairs,(almost)
efficient kidney exchange can be achieved by using at most 3-way cycles, ie by using cycles …

Paired and altruistic kidney donation in the UK: Algorithms and experimentation

DF Manlove, G O'Malley - International Symposium on Experimental …, 2012 - Springer
We study the computational problem of identifying optimal sets of kidney exchanges in the
UK. We show how to expand an integer programming-based formulation [1, 19] in order to …