Communication, distortion, and randomness in metric voting

D Kempe - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial …, 2020 - ojs.aaai.org
In distortion-based analysis of social choice rules over metric spaces, voters and candidates
are jointly embedded in a metric space. Voters rank candidates by non-decreasing distance …

Persuasion with limited communication

S Dughmi, D Kempe, R Qiang - … of the 2016 ACM Conference on …, 2016 - dl.acm.org
We examine information structure design, also called" persuasion" or" signaling," in the
presence of a constraint on the amount of communication. We focus on the fundamental …

Auctions with severely bounded communication

L Blumrosen, N Nisan, I Segal - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2007 - jair.org
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only
transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-and profit …

Mechanism design with communication constraints

D Mookherjee, M Tsumagari - Journal of Political Economy, 2014 - journals.uchicago.edu
We consider mechanism design in which message sets are restricted owing to
communication costs, preventing full revelation of information. A principal contracts with …

Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology

A Li, M Yang - Theoretical Economics, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze
sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop …

A Mechanism Design Approach for Multi-party Machine Learning

M Chen, Y Liu, W Shen, Y Shen, P Tang… - International Workshop on …, 2022 - Springer
In a multi-party machine learning system, different parties cooperate on optimizing towards
better models by sharing data in a privacy-preserving way. A major challenge in learning is …

Auctions with severely bounded communication

L Blumrosen, N Nisan - The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on …, 2002 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only
transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-maximizing and …

Communication and efficiency in auctions

N Kos - Games and Economic Behavior, 2012 - Elsevier
We study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over
an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary …

Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design

P Dütting, F Fischer, DC Parkes - … of the 12th ACM conference on …, 2011 - dl.acm.org
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts
that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one …

[PDF][PDF] A Theory of Expressiveness in Mechanisms.

M Benisch, NM Sadeh, T Sandholm - AAAI, 2008 - cdn.aaai.org
A key trend in (electronic) commerce is a demand for higher levels of expressiveness in the
mechanisms that mediate interactions. We develop a theory that ties the expressiveness of …