Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost
This paper studies a dynamic principal–agent setting in which the principal needs to
dynamically schedule an agent to work or be suspended. When the agent is directed to work …
dynamically schedule an agent to work or be suspended. When the agent is directed to work …
Trust-and-Evaluate: A Dynamic Nonmonetary Mechanism for Internal Capital Allocation
To stay competitive, firms regularly invest in innovation by supporting internal capital
projects (funded and executed in-house) that explore new products and operational …
projects (funded and executed in-house) that explore new products and operational …
Navigating Exogenous Shocks: Optimal Dynamic Contracts under Job Destruction and Outside Options
Z Zhao, F Tian, F Zhang - The Lancet, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
We study a dynamic contract design problem under the risks of external shocks, including
job destruction and outside options. In our model, a principal hires an agent to increase …
job destruction and outside options. In our model, a principal hires an agent to increase …
Non-Profit Support in Education: Resource Allocation and Students' Lifetime Outcomes
Abstract Problem Definition: One of the seventeen United Nations Sustainable Development
Goals aims for inclusive and equitable quality education, with lifelong benefits, for all. Our …
Goals aims for inclusive and equitable quality education, with lifelong benefits, for all. Our …
Combating Overbilling in Outsourced Projects: A Dynamic Auditing Mechanism
Firms routinely outsource some of their business requirements to external agents (eg,
vendors, contractors) for a variety of reasons; eg, to focus on their core competencies or to …
vendors, contractors) for a variety of reasons; eg, to focus on their core competencies or to …
[PDF][PDF] Dynamic Contract Design with Learning
We investigate a dynamic moral hazard problem in which the agent's capability is unknown
to both the principal and the agent in the beginning and can be learned over time …
to both the principal and the agent in the beginning and can be learned over time …
Essays in Operations Management
VDG Takasi - 2024 - utd-ir.tdl.org
This dissertation consists of three main chapters, which focus on resource allocation
problems that arise in the operations of crowdsourcing contest platforms and in the …
problems that arise in the operations of crowdsourcing contest platforms and in the …
The Economic Consequences of Award Revocation: Evidence from the National Civilized City Award Campaign
J Fan, C Ling - Available at SSRN 4638599 - papers.ssrn.com
Revocation policies are frequently used in various awards to preserve their prestige, yet
their effects are rarely measured. In this paper, we explore the impact of revoking the …
their effects are rarely measured. In this paper, we explore the impact of revoking the …
Essays on Dynamic Incentives
F Zhang - 2022 - search.proquest.com
This thesis consists of three essays on dynamic contracts or games with incomplete
information. In Chapter 1, I study concealing losses in dynamic relationships. I investigate a …
information. In Chapter 1, I study concealing losses in dynamic relationships. I investigate a …
[PDF][PDF] Punish underperformance with resting—Optimal dynamic contracts in the presence of switching cost
This paper studies a dynamic principal-agent setting in which the principal needs to
dynamically schedule an agent to work or rest. When the agent is motivated to work, the …
dynamically schedule an agent to work or rest. When the agent is motivated to work, the …