Implementation theory

E Maskin, T Sjöström - Handbook of social Choice and Welfare, 2002 - Elsevier
The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such
that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social …

[BOOK][B] Using surveys to value public goods: the contingent valuation method

RC Mitchell, RT Carson - 2013 - taylorfrancis.com
Economists and others have long believed that by balancing the costs of such public goods
as air quality and wilderness areas against their benefits, informed policy choices can be …

Strategyproof social choice

S Barberà - Handbook of social choice and welfare, 2011 - Elsevier
Strategyproof Social Choice - ScienceDirect Skip to main contentSkip to article Elsevier
logo Journals & Books Search RegisterSign in View PDF Download full volume Search …

The impact of China's economic reforms on agricultural productivity growth

J McMillan, J Whalley, L Zhu - Journal of Political Economy, 1989 - journals.uchicago.edu
This paper presents a method for assessing the relative importance of price increases and
strengthened individual incentives due to the introduction of the responsibility system for the …

Robust mechanism design

D Bergemann, S Morris - Econometrica, 2005 - JSTOR
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment
among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying mechanism design on …

Social comparisons and contributions to online communities: A field experiment on movielens

Y Chen, FM Harper, J Konstan, SX Li - American Economic Review, 2010 - aeaweb.org
We design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase
contributions to an online community. We find that, after receiving behavioral information …

Asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents

GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite - The Review of Economic Studies, 1990 - academic.oup.com
A yes or no decision must be made about some issue. All agents must agree. The “Coase
Theorem” asserts that the efficient outcome will always result. Suppose the value (positive or …

Mechanism design: How to implement social goals

ES Maskin - American Economic Review, 2008 - pubs.aeaweb.org
Condorcet winner) is sometimes viewed as a natural desideratum (see Partha Dasgupta
and Eric Maskin, forthcoming). In the auctioning of assets, there are two different criteria by …

Mechanism theory

MO Jackson - Available at SSRN 2542983, 2014 - papers.ssrn.com
Some of the basic results and insights of the literature on mechanism design are presented.
In that literature game theoretic reasoning is used to model social institutions as varied as …

[PDF][PDF] Sharing the cost of muliticast transmissions (preliminary version)

J Feigenbaum, C Papadimitriou… - Proceedings of the thirty …, 2000 - dl.acm.org
We investigate cost-sharing algorithms for multicast transmission. Economic considerations
point to two distinct mechanisms, marginal costand Shapley value, as the two solutions most …