This review summarizes a nascent body of theoretical research on design of incentives
when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons …

A principal wishes to screen an agent along several dimensions of private information
simultaneously. The agent has quasilinear preferences that are additively separable across …

We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller who is partially informed about the
distribution of buyer's valuations, only knowing its first N moments. The seller chooses the …

I construct an informationally robust auction to sell a common‐value good. I examine the
revenue guarantee of an auction over all information structures of bidders and all equilibria …

Auctions are widely used in practice. Although auctions are also extensively studied in the
literature, most of the developments rely on the significant common prior assumption. We …

A seller chooses a reserve price in a second-price auction to maximize worst-case expected
revenue when she knows only the mean of value distribution and an upper bound on either …

We investigate the idea that linear contracts are reliable because they give the same
incentives for effort at every point along the contract. We ask whether this reliability leads to …

An indivisible object may be sold to one of $ n $ agents who know their valuations of the
object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of …

A buyer makes an offer to a privately informed seller for a good of uncertain quality. Quality
determines both the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation, and the buyer evaluates …

Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which
yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply …