Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to
simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of …

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma there is no strategy that is evolutionarily stable, and a
profusion of neutrally stable ones. But how stable is neutrally stable? We show that in …

ABED is free and open-source software for simulating evolutionary game dynamics in finite
populations. We explain how ABED can be used to simulate a wide range of dynamics …

We study how long it takes for large populations of interacting agents to come close to Nash
equilibrium when they adapt their behavior using a stochastic better reply dynamic. Prior …

We introduce evolutionary dynamics for two-action games where agents with diverse
preferences use statistical inference to guide their behavior. We show that the dynamic …

This paper investigates the role of loss-aversion in affecting the long-run equilibria of
stochastic evolutionary dynamics. We consider a finite population of loss-averse agents who …

We study the effect of introducing a bilingual option on the long run equilibrium outcome in a
class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff and risk dominant equilibria …

Abstract Logit Dynamics [Blume, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993] is a randomized
best response dynamics for strategic games: at every time step a player is selected uniformly …

This paper considers populations of agents whose behavior when playing some underlying
game is governed by perturbed best (or better) response dynamics with perturbation …

We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the probabilities that
agents choose suboptimal actions are dependent on payoff consequences. We prove a …