Turnitin
降AI改写
早检测系统
早降重系统
Turnitin-UK版
万方检测-期刊版
维普编辑部版
Grammarly检测
Paperpass检测
checkpass检测
PaperYY检测
The sample complexity of online contract design
We study the hidden-action principal-agent problem in an online setting. In each round, the
principal posts a contract that specifies the payment to the agent based on each outcome …
principal posts a contract that specifies the payment to the agent based on each outcome …
Multi-agent contracts
We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in
which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the heart …
which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the heart …
Contracting with a learning agent
Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart
of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions of the …
of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions of the …
Mechanism design for large language models
We investigate auction mechanisms to support the emerging format of AI-generated content.
We in particular study how to aggregate several LLMs in an incentive compatible manner. In …
We in particular study how to aggregate several LLMs in an incentive compatible manner. In …
Combinatorial contracts
We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the
execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset of …
execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset of …
Approximately optimal mechanism design
The field of optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, as well
as several killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from …
as several killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from …
Optimal no-regret learning for one-sided lipschitz functions
Inspired by applications in pricing and contract design, we study the maximization of one-
sided Lipschitz functions, which only provide the (weaker) guarantee that they do not grow …
sided Lipschitz functions, which only provide the (weaker) guarantee that they do not grow …
Designing menus of contracts efficiently: The power of randomization
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an
outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) so as to incentivize the agent to take …
outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) so as to incentivize the agent to take …
Combinatorial contracts beyond gross substitutes
We study the combinatorial contracting problem of Dütting et al.[13], in which a principal
seeks to incentivize an agent to take a set of costly actions. In their model, there is a binary …
seeks to incentivize an agent to take a set of costly actions. In their model, there is a binary …
Maximizing welfare with incentive-aware evaluation mechanisms
Motivated by applications such as college admission and insurance rate determination, we
propose an evaluation problem where the inputs are controlled by strategic individuals who …
propose an evaluation problem where the inputs are controlled by strategic individuals who …