We revisit the classical problem of designing Budget-Feasible Mechanisms (BFMs) for
submodular valuation functions, which has been extensively studied since the seminal …

We provide the first analysis of (deferred acceptance) clock auctions in the learning-
augmented framework. These auctions satisfy a unique list of very appealing properties …

A lot of applications in web economics need to maximize the revenue under a budget for
payments and also guarantee the truthfulness of users, so Budget-Feasible Mechanism …

In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell some service
to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer i has a private value vi for receiving this service …

We design and analyze deterministic and randomized clock auctions for single-parameter
domains with downward-closed feasibility constraints, aiming to maximize the social welfare …

In recent decades, the design of budget feasible mechanisms for a wide range of
procurement auction settings has received significant attention in the Artificial Intelligence …

This paper studies the facility location game with payments, in which customers and facilities
are located at publicly known locations on a line segment, and the facilities are strategic …

We study procurement auctions, where an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from
strategic sellers with private costs. The quality of services is measured by a submodular …

We consider a procurement problem where a software agent procures multiple services from
self-interested providers with private costs and uncertain reliabilities to complete a budget …

Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its
introduction by Singer. An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in …