We study a game of strategic experimentation with two‐armed bandits where the risky arm
distributes lump‐sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. Its intensity is either high or …

We analyse a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. Either
player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known pay-off or a …

We experimentally implement a dynamic public‐good problem, where the public good in
question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world …

This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper
incentives to explore a hypothesis that can be either true or false. The agent can shirk, thus …

This paper proposes the following mechanism whereby polarization of beliefs could
eliminate political gridlock instead of intensifying disagreement: the expectation of political …

We examine a two-player game with two-armed exponential bandits à la (Keller et al. in
Econometrica 73: 39–68, 2005), where players operate different technologies for exploring …

We present a two-armed bandit model of decision making under uncertainty where the
expected return to investing in the “risky arm” increases when choosing that arm and …

Retweeting behavior is a key mechanism for information diffusion in microblogging services
such as Sina Weibo. It is the mechanism of retweeting that leads to the fast and wide …

We experimentally investigate a game of strategic experimentation in which information
arrives through fully revealing, publicly observable, breakdowns. As predicted by theory, we …

We consider the multi-armed bandit setting with a twist. Rather than having just one decision
maker deciding which arm to pull in each round, we have n different decision makers …