With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and
incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too …

We study a sender's optimal choice of precision when he selects from a class of random
signals to persuade a receiver to accept his request, with higher costs associated with …

We study a model that characterizes the conditions under which past misbehavior becomes
the subject of present scandal, with consequences for both the implicated politician and the …

A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a
deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over …

A manager who learns privately about a project over time may want to delay quitting it if
recognizing failure/lack of success hurts his reputation. In the banking industry, managers …

This article develops a reputational theory of political falsehoods. Politicians are motivated
by the desire to build a positive reputation, therefore, they will be more likely to deliver false …

Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of
these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible …

We investigate the existence of an 'electoral cycle bias' in the timing of media coverage of
news with high political salience. In particular, we analyze how the electoral cycles at the …

We propose a model of product reviews in which some are genuine and some are fake in
order to shed light on the value of information provided on platforms like TripAdvisor, Yelp …

We develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance. Time-
constrained consumers browse through news items across competing outlets. They choose …