This paper studies a class of games,“all‐pay contests,” which capture general asymmetries
and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying, competition for market power …

We design an incentive mechanism based on all-pay auctions for participatory sensing. The
organizer (principal) aims to attract a high amount of contribution from participating users …

Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape.
In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are …

The heterogeneous abilities of players in various competitive contexts often lead to
undesirable outcomes such as low effort provision, a lack of diversity, and inequality. A …

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent
upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the …

This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric
competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include …

In the attempt to compete for foreign investment, local jurisdictions in China set up a large
number of development zones for industrial and commercial uses. Many of these areas …

Many crowdsourcing scenarios are heterogeneous in the sense that, not only the workers'
types (eg, abilities or costs) are different, but the beliefs (probabilistic knowledge) about their …

Crowdsourcing can be modeled as a principal-agent problem in which the principal
(crowdsourcer) desires to solicit a maximal contribution from a group of agents (participants) …

Bug Auctions: Vulnerability Markets Reconsidered Page 1 Motivation Vulnerability Market Bug
Auction Conclusion Bug Auctions: Vulnerability Markets Reconsidered Andy Ozment 14 May …