The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the
center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last …

In this paper, we propose a fractional preference model for the facility location game with two
facilities that serve the similar purpose on a line where each agent has his location …

In this paper, we focus on the facility location games with the property of dual preference.
Dual preference property indicates that both two preferences of agents, staying close to and …

We consider a single-facility location problem, where agents are positioned on the real line
and are partitioned into multiple disjoint districts. The goal is to choose a location (where a …

We study the mechanism design problem of a social planner for locating two facilities on a
line interval [0, 1], where a set of n strategic agents report their locations and a mechanism …

We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-
interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on …

We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three
agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability …

We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources.
We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line …

The study of the facility location problem in the presence of self-interested agents has
recently emerged as the benchmark problem in the research on mechanism design without …

We study the facility location problems where agents are located on a real line and divided
into groups based on criteria such as ethnicity or age. Our aim is to design mechanisms to …