On the tractability of SHAP explanations

G Van den Broeck, A Lykov, M Schleich… - Journal of Artificial …, 2022 - jair.org
SHAP explanations are a popular feature-attribution mechanism for explainable AI. They
use game-theoretic notions to measure the influence of individual features on the prediction …

Efficient computation of the Shapley value for game-theoretic network centrality

TP Michalak, KV Aadithya, PL Szczepanski… - Journal of Artificial …, 2013 - jair.org
The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in
coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in …

Bounding the estimation error of sampling-based Shapley value approximation

S Maleki, L Tran-Thanh, G Hines, T Rahwan… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2013 - arxiv.org
The Shapley value is arguably the most central normative solution concept in cooperative
game theory. It specifies a unique way in which the reward from cooperation can be" fairly" …

Addressing the computational issues of the Shapley value with applications in the smart grid

S Maleki - 2015 - eprints.soton.ac.uk
We consider the computational issues that arise in using the Shapley value in practical
applications. Calculating the Shapley value involves computing the value of an exponential …

Using the shapley value to analyze algorithm portfolios

A Fréchette, L Kotthoff, T Michalak, T Rahwan… - Proceedings of the …, 2016 - ojs.aaai.org
Algorithms for NP-complete problems often have different strengths andweaknesses, and
thus algorithm portfolios often outperform individualalgorithms. It is surprisingly difficult to …

Efficient computation of the shapley value for centrality in networks

KV Aadithya, B Ravindran, TP Michalak… - Internet and Network …, 2010 - Springer
Abstract The Shapley Value is arguably the most important normative solution concept in
coalitional games. One of its applications is in the domain of networks, where the Shapley …

[HTML][HTML] Characteristic function games with restricted agent interactions: Core-stability and coalition structures

G Chalkiadakis, G Greco, E Markakis - Artificial Intelligence, 2016 - Elsevier
In many real-world settings, the structure of the environment constrains the formation of
coalitions among agents. These settings can be represented by characteristic function …

Representing utility functions via weighted goals

J Uckelman, Y Chevaleyre, U Endriss… - Mathematical Logic …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
We analyze the expressivity, succinctness, and complexity of a family of languages based
on weighted propositional formulas for the representation of utility functions. The central idea …

What will they say?—public announcement games

T Ågotnes, H van Ditmarsch - Synthese, 2011 - Springer
Dynamic epistemic logic describes the possible information-changing actions available to
individual agents, and their knowledge pre-and post conditions. For example, public …

A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities

T Michalak, D Marciniak, M Szamotulski, T Rahwan… - 2010 - eprints.soton.ac.uk
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems that exhibit
externalities from coalition formation, ie, systems in which the gain from forming a coalition …