Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can
believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize …

It is one thing to hold that merely statistical evidence is sometimes insufficient for rational
belief, as in typical lottery and profiling cases. It is another thing to hold that merely statistical …

What is knowledge? I this paper I defend the claim that knowledge is justified true belief by
arguing that, contrary to common belief, Gettier cases do not refute it. My defence will be of …

To say that someone is aware of a fact is a commonplace expression, not at all a
philosopher's term of art. It is often used to criticize, excuse, admonish, and inform others …

In this paper I investigate whether there are any cases in which it is rational for a person to
hold inconsistent beliefs and, if there are, just what implications this might have for the theory …

The relation of normic support offers a novel solution to the proof paradox: a paradox in
evidence law arising from legal cases involving merely statistical evidence (Smith in Mind …

In this paper I will compare two competing accounts of assertion: the knowledge account
and the justified belief account. When it comes to the evidence that is typically used to …

The law requires criminal guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. There are two
different approaches to construing this legal rule. On an epistemic approach, the rule is …

This paper generalizes the preface paradox beyond the conjunctive aggregation of beliefs
and constructs an analogous paradox for deontic reasoning. The analysis of the deontic …

In this paper, I'll survey a number of closure principles of epistemic justification and find them
all wanting. However, it'll be my contention that there'sa novel closure principle of epistemic …