Amplifying main memory-based timing covert and side channels using processing-in-memory operations

K Kanellopoulos, F Bostanci, A Olgun… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
The adoption of processing-in-memory (PiM) architectures has been gaining momentum
because they provide high performance and low energy consumption by alleviating the data …

[HTML][HTML] Distrusting cores by separating computation from isolation

N Asmussen, T Miemietz, S Haas, M Roitzsch - Journal of Systems …, 2025 - Elsevier
Security mechanisms such as address spaces rely on the assumption that processor cores
can be fully trusted. But the steady influx of side-channel vulnerabilities in processors is …

I Know What You Sync: Covert and Side Channel Attacks on File Systems via syncfs

C Gu, Y Zhang, N Abu-Ghazaleh - arxiv preprint arxiv:2411.10883, 2024 - arxiv.org
Operating Systems enforce logical isolation using abstractions such as processes,
containers, and isolation technologies to protect a system from malicious or buggy code. In …

SoK: A Systems Perspective on Compound AI Threats and Countermeasures

S Banerjee, P Sahu, M Luo… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
Large language models (LLMs) used across enterprises often use proprietary models and
operate on sensitive inputs and data. The wide range of attack vectors identified in prior …

U Can Touch This! Microarchitectural Timing Attacks via Machine Clears

BB Brumley - arxiv preprint arxiv:2502.09864, 2025 - arxiv.org
Microarchitectural timing attacks exploit subtle timing variations caused by hardware
behaviors to leak sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce MCHammer, a novel side …