ProVerif is an automatic symbolic protocol verifier. It supports a wide range of cryptographic
primitives, defined by rewrite rules or by equations. It can prove various security properties …

Computer-aided cryptography is an active area of research that develops and applies
formal, machine-checkable approaches to the design, analysis, and implementation of …

We study the interaction of the programming construct “new,” which generates statically
scoped names, with communication via messages on channels. This interaction is crucial in …

This paper presents a major overhaul of one the most widely used symbolic security protocol
verifiers, ProVerif. We provide two main contributions. First, we extend ProVerif with lemmas …

Given the central importance of designing secure protocols, providing solid mathematical
foundations and computer-assisted methods to attest for their correctness is becoming …

Automated verification has become an essential part in the security evaluation of
cryptographic protocols. Recently, there has been a considerable effort to lift the theory and …

Many cryptographic security definitions can be naturally formulated as observational
equivalence properties. However, existing automated tools for verifying the observational …

Vote privacy is a fundamental right, which needs to be protected not only during an election,
or for a limited time afterwards, but for the foreseeable future. Numerous electronic voting (e …

Security protocols are distributed programs that aim at securing communications by the
means of cryptography. They are for instance used to secure electronic payments, home …

The formal analysis of cryptographic protocols traditionally focuses on trace and
equivalence properties, for which decision procedures in the symbolic (or Dolev-Yao, or DY) …