[PDF][PDF] Deep learning for revenue-optimal auctions with budgets

Z Feng, H Narasimhan… - Proceedings of the 17th …, 2018 - aamas.csc.liv.ac.uk
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions for settings with private budgets is a hard task.
Even the single-item case is not fully understood, and there are no analytical results for …

[PDF][PDF] Feature extraction and duplicate detection for text mining: A survey

RS Ramya, KR Venugopal, SS Iyengar… - Global Journal of …, 2017 - core.ac.uk
Text mining, also known as Intelligent Text Analysis is an important research area. It is very
difficult to focus on the most appropriate information due to the high dimensionality of data …

Gameopt+: Improving fuel efficiency in unregulated heterogeneous traffic intersections via optimal multi-agent cooperative control

N Suriyarachchi, R Chandra, A Anantula… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
Better fuel efficiency leads to better financial security as well as a cleaner environment. We
propose a novel approach for improving fuel efficiency in unstructured and unregulated …

Reinvigorating sustainability in Internet of Things marketing: Framework for multi-round real-time bidding with game machine learning

R Zhang, C Jiang, J Zhang, J Fan, J Ren, H **a - Internet of Things, 2023 - Elsevier
Auction-based incentive mechanisms can satisfy the heterogeneous demands of both
Demand Side Platforms (DSP) and Supply Side Platforms (SSP) in Internet of Things (IoT) …

Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets

H Hirai, R Sato - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022 - pubsonline.informs.org
In this paper, we present a new model and mechanisms for auctions in two-sided markets of
buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model …

Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Indivisible Goods.

H Hirai, R Sato - WINE, 2023 - dl.acm.org
The theoretical foundation for budget-constrained auctions is an unavoidable step toward
further social implementation of auction theory. A representative example of such auctions is …

Polyhedral clinching auctions with a single sample

R Sato - arxiv preprint arxiv:2302.03458, 2023 - arxiv.org
In this study, we investigate auctions in two-sided markets with budget constraints on buyers.
Our goal is to propose an efficient mechanism that satisfies dominant strategy incentive …

An Algorithm for the Assignment Game Beyond Additive Valuations

E Balkanski, C En, Y Faenza - arxiv preprint arxiv:2406.13620, 2024 - arxiv.org
The assignment game, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1971), is a classic model for two-
sided matching markets between buyers and sellers. In the original assignment game, it is …

Do not waste money on advertising spend: Bid recommendation via concavity changes

D Kong, K Shmakov, J Yang - arxiv preprint arxiv:2212.13923, 2022 - arxiv.org
In computational advertising, a challenging problem is how to recommend the bid for
advertisers to achieve the best return on investment (ROI) given budget constraint. This …

Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets

H Hirai, R Sato - arxiv preprint arxiv:1708.04881, 2017 - arxiv.org
In this paper, we present a new model and two mechanisms for auctions in two-sided
markets of buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model …