We study the combinatorial contract design problem, introduced and studied by Dütting et
al.(2021, 2022), in both the single and multi-agent settings. Prior work has examined the …

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent
to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game …

This paper introduces an objective for optimizing proper scoring rules. The objective is to
maximize the increase in payoff of a forecaster who exerts a binary level of effort to refine a …

A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert
effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A …

This paper develops a framework for the design of scoring rules to optimally incentivize an
agent to exert a multi-dimensional effort. This framework is a generalization to strategic …

We study the combinatorial contract design problem, introduced and studied by Dutting et.
al.(2021, 2022), in both the single and multi-agent settings. Prior work has examined the …

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This
setting models strategic interactions between a uniformed receiver and a set of informed …

This paper considers a principal-agent problem of delegation that features two types of
information asymmetry. A principal delegates a task to the agent; the agent can first choose …

This paper introduces an objective for optimizing proper scoring rules. The objective is to
maximize the increase in payoff of a forecaster who exerts a binary level of effort to refine a …

We study a sender-receiver model where the receiver can commit to a decision rule before
the sender determines the information policy. The decision rule can depend on the signal …