Centralized matching markets based on the preferences of the concerned agents have been
one of the successful stories of algorithmic economics. These approaches have been …

In this work, we consider a student-project-resource matching-allocation problem, where
students have preferences over projects and the projects have preferences over students. In …

We investigate markets with a set of students on one side and a set of colleges on the other.
A student and college can be linked by a weighted contract that defines the student's wage …

We introduce a simple, but fundamental problem called Student-Project-Resource matching-
allocation problem (SPR). 1 On one hand, SPR can be considered as a two-sided, many-to …

We introduce a new two-sided stable matching problem that describes the summer
internship matching practice of an Australian university. The model is a case between two …

In this paper, we introduce online knapsack problems with a resource buffer. In the
problems, we are given a knapsack with capacity $1 $, a buffer with capacity $ R\ge 1$, and …

The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied to many real-
life application domains. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of …

We introduce a new type of distributional constraints called ratio constraints, which explicitly
specify the required balance among schools in two-sided matching. Since ratio constraints …

This paper examines two-sided matching with budget constraints where one side (a firm or
hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (a worker or doctor). In a …

Centralized two-sided matching market algorithms have received immense success in
several application domains including matching students to schools, residents to hospitals …