Turnitin
降AI改写
早检测系统
早降重系统
Turnitin-UK版
万方检测-期刊版
维普编辑部版
Grammarly检测
Paperpass检测
checkpass检测
PaperYY检测
Persuasion with limited communication capacity
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker
communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages …
communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages …
Almost-Bayesian quadratic persuasion
In this article, we relax the Bayesianity assumption in the now-traditional model of Bayesian
Persuasion introduced by Kamenica & Gentzkow. Unlike preexisting approaches—which …
Persuasion introduced by Kamenica & Gentzkow. Unlike preexisting approaches—which …
Almost-Bayesian quadratic persuasion with a scalar prior
In this article, we consider a problem of strategic communication between a sender (Alice)
and a receiver (Bob) akin to the now-traditional model of Bayesian Persuasion introduced by …
and a receiver (Bob) akin to the now-traditional model of Bayesian Persuasion introduced by …
Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
This paper considers dynamic (multi-stage) signaling games involving an encoder and a
decoder who have subjective models on the cost functions. We consider both Nash …
decoder who have subjective models on the cost functions. We consider both Nash …
Strong coordination of signals and actions over noisy channels with two-sided state information
We consider a network of two nodes separated by a noisy channel with two-sided state
information, in which the input and output signals have to be coordinated with the source …
information, in which the input and output signals have to be coordinated with the source …
Joint empirical coordination of source and channel
In a decentralized and self-configuring network, the communication devices are considered
as autonomous decision makers that sense their environment and that implement optimal …
as autonomous decision makers that sense their environment and that implement optimal …
On the number of bins in equilibria for signaling games
We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized quadratic cheap talk problem
in which an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned …
in which an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned …
Almost-Bayesian quadratic persuasion (extended version)
In this article, we relax the Bayesianity assumption in the now-traditional model of Bayesian
Persuasion introduced by Kamenica & Gentzkow. Unlike preexisting approaches--which …
Persuasion introduced by Kamenica & Gentzkow. Unlike preexisting approaches--which …
Strategic communication with side information at the decoder
We investigate the problem of strategic point-to-point communication with side information at
the decoder, in which the encoder and the decoder have mismatched distortion functions …
the decoder, in which the encoder and the decoder have mismatched distortion functions …
Strategic successive refinement coding for Bayesian persuasion with two decoders
We study the multi-user Bayesian persuasion game between one encoder and two
decoders, where the first decoder is better informed than the second decoder. We consider …
decoders, where the first decoder is better informed than the second decoder. We consider …