Online feedback mechanisms harness the bidirectional communication capabilities of the
Internet to engineer large-scale, word-of-mouth networks. Best known so far as a technology …

The paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining. The idea is to investigate and
highlight the influence of bargaining 'postures' on bargaining outcomes. A complete …

This paper surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information. We
first develop the adverse-selection approach to reputations in the context of a long-lived …

Traditional centralized approaches to security are difficult to apply to large, distributed, multi-
agent systems (MAS). Develo** a notion of trust that is based on the reputation of agents …

WE CONSIDER A GAME between a patient player 1 and a nonmyopic but less patient
opponent, player 2. As usual in reputation models, we suppose that the patient player's type …

Consider a two‐person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions
and offers each period, and collect payoffs (as a function of that period's actions) while …

Reputation mechanisms have become an important component of electronic markets,
hel** to build trust and elicit cooperation among loosely connected and geographically …

I highlight how reputational concerns provide a natural explanation for “deadline effects,” the
high frequency of deals prior to a deadline in bargaining. Rational agents imitate the …

We define belief‐free equilibria in two‐player games with incomplete information as
sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best replies after every …

Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Page 1 Games and
Economic Behavior 29, 274–308 (1999) Article ID game.1999.0722, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com …