When people interact in familiar settings, social conventions usually develop so that people
tend to disregard alternatives outside the convention. For rational players to usually restrict …

A new solution concept for finite games is presented and analyzed. It is defined in terms of
outcomes—probability distributions over the plays of the game. Solid outcomes are robust to …

This entry surveys research on learning in games. The subject is as old as game theory
itself, dating to the work of Cournot in the early nineteenth century. But, with some important …

We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit
utility representations. First of all, we extend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential …

This paper provides an in-depth study of the (most) refined best-response correspondence
introduced by Balkenborg et al.(Theor Econ 8: 165–192, 2013). An example demonstrates …

Abstract Norde et al.[Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the
equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games …

Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents
appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices. More recent choices can be …

Strategic reasoning is part of our everyday lives: we negotiate prices, bid in auctions, write
contracts, and play games. We choose actions in these scenarios based on our preferences …

A product set of pure strategies is a Nash block if it contains all best replies to the Nash
equilibria of the game in which the players are restricted to the strategies in the block. This …

This work concentrates on two topics, networks and game theory, and learning in games.
The first part of this thesis looks at network games and the role of incomplete information in …