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Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for
the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve …
the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve …
Auction design for roi-constrained buyers
We combine theory and empirics to (i) show that some buyers in online advertising markets
are financially constrained and (ii) demonstrate how to design auctions that take into …
are financially constrained and (ii) demonstrate how to design auctions that take into …
Auto-bidding and auctions in online advertising: A survey
In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing
adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges …
adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges …
Autobidding auctions in the presence of user costs
We study autobidding ad auctions with user costs, where each bidder is value-maximizing
subject to a return-over-investment (ROI) constraint, and the seller aims to maximize the …
subject to a return-over-investment (ROI) constraint, and the seller aims to maximize the …
Optimal mechanisms for value maximizers with budget constraints via target clip**
We study the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for value-maximizing agents with
budget constraints. Agents have return-on-spend constraints requiring a minimum amount of …
budget constraints. Agents have return-on-spend constraints requiring a minimum amount of …
Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope
A central issue in applying auction theory in practice is the problem of dealing with budget-
constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible …
constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible …
On designing strategy-proof budget feasible online mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing with time-discounting values
Mobile crowdsensing has become increasingly popular due to its ability to collect a massive
amount of data with the help of many individual smartphone users. A crowdsensing platform …
amount of data with the help of many individual smartphone users. A crowdsensing platform …
Truthful multi-unit procurements with budgets
We study procurement games where each seller supplies multiple units of his item, with a
cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each …
cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each …
Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets
H Hirai, R Sato - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022 - pubsonline.informs.org
In this paper, we present a new model and mechanisms for auctions in two-sided markets of
buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model …
buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model …
Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Indivisible Goods.
H Hirai, R Sato - WINE, 2023 - dl.acm.org
The theoretical foundation for budget-constrained auctions is an unavoidable step toward
further social implementation of auction theory. A representative example of such auctions is …
further social implementation of auction theory. A representative example of such auctions is …