Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world

S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao… - Advances in Neural …, 2021 - proceedings.neurips.cc
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for
the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve …

Auction design for roi-constrained buyers

N Golrezaei, I Lobel, R Paes Leme - Proceedings of the Web …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
We combine theory and empirics to (i) show that some buyers in online advertising markets
are financially constrained and (ii) demonstrate how to design auctions that take into …

Auto-bidding and auctions in online advertising: A survey

G Aggarwal, A Badanidiyuru, SR Balseiro… - ACM SIGecom …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing
adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges …

Autobidding auctions in the presence of user costs

Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, H Zhang, S Zuo - Proceedings of the ACM …, 2023 - dl.acm.org
We study autobidding ad auctions with user costs, where each bidder is value-maximizing
subject to a return-over-investment (ROI) constraint, and the seller aims to maximize the …

Optimal mechanisms for value maximizers with budget constraints via target clip**

S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni… - … School Research Paper, 2022 - papers.ssrn.com
We study the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for value-maximizing agents with
budget constraints. Agents have return-on-spend constraints requiring a minimum amount of …

Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope

G Goel, V Mirrokni, RP Leme - Journal of the ACM (JACM), 2015 - dl.acm.org
A central issue in applying auction theory in practice is the problem of dealing with budget-
constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible …

On designing strategy-proof budget feasible online mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing with time-discounting values

Z Zheng, S Yang, J **e, F Wu, X Gao… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2020 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Mobile crowdsensing has become increasingly popular due to its ability to collect a massive
amount of data with the help of many individual smartphone users. A crowdsensing platform …

Truthful multi-unit procurements with budgets

H Chan, J Chen - International Conference on Web and Internet …, 2014 - Springer
We study procurement games where each seller supplies multiple units of his item, with a
cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each …

Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets

H Hirai, R Sato - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022 - pubsonline.informs.org
In this paper, we present a new model and mechanisms for auctions in two-sided markets of
buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model …

Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Indivisible Goods.

H Hirai, R Sato - WINE, 2023 - dl.acm.org
The theoretical foundation for budget-constrained auctions is an unavoidable step toward
further social implementation of auction theory. A representative example of such auctions is …