Copious laboratory and some field evidence suggests that people err in predicting others'
behavior, learning from others' actions, and best responding to their beliefs. Some of these …

This paper reviews the recent development and new findings of the literature on learning-to-
forecast experiments (LtFEs). In general, the stylized finding in the typical LtFEs, namely the …

We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard
models of strategic thinking, in this framework the player's “depth of reasoning” is …

This paper proposes a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty
equivalents analogous to measuring risk attitudes in lotteries. We apply this method by …

We examine whether the “Level-k” model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-
game predictions at the individual level. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels …

In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjectsʼ beliefs about the
cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 …

This paper focuses on instructions and procedures as the reasons that subjects fail to
behave according to the predictions of game theory in two-person “guessing game”(beauty …

We introduce a generalization of the Beauty Contest (BC) game as a framework that
incorporates different models from micro-and macroeconomics by formulating their reduced …

Does performance in strategic settings depend on whether players realize that an optimal
way to play is feasible? We introduce a zero-sum game of perfect information, simple …

We examine strategic awareness in experimental games, that is, the question of whether
subjects realize they are playing a game and thus have to form beliefs about others' actions …