We provide a model of self-selection by candidates in a probabilistic voting environment to
shed light on the forces sha** the quality of politicians from both the supply and demand …

What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public
goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government …

What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political
accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that …

This paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and
on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a political …

We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public
officials accountable (ie, subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability …

Is electoral competition good for political selection? To address this issue, we introduce a
theoretical model where ideological parties select and allocate high-valence (experts) and …

Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies: there are
career politicians (ie, politicians who work in the political sector until retirement), and political …

This paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their
performance. The paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral …

This paper investigates whether information about improved public services can help build
trust in state institutions and move people away from nonstate actors. We find that (truthful) …

We consider a society that has to elect an official who provides a public service for the
citizens. Potential candidates differ in their competence and every potential candidate has …